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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
S~-\.LT

LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-YS.-

S~-\.~fjiiA

Case No. 7814

B. PERKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, SAMMIA B. PERKINS, was convicted by a jury in the City Court for operating a disorderly house in violation of Section 4816 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, and from this
conviction she appealed to the Third Judicial District
Court where, after a trial de novo, she was again convicted of the same offense by jury. From this conviction
the said Defendant appeals to this court.
The facts substantially developed by the evidence
of said case are as follows :
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That the City Cmnmission and Police Department
of Salt Lake City had received complaints concerning
the operation of a rooming house located at 747 South
Second East in Salt Lake City (R. 32, 33). Pursuant
thereto periodic checks were made of said premises by
the Police Department of Salt Lake City. It was found
that a 1nixed group of both white and colored minors
were frequenting this place at late hours of the night and
that music was played in said place that could be heard
for a distance of fifty to seventy-five feet therefrom (R.
6, 7 and 8). That the said home contained many whiskey
bottles and glasses frmn which whiskey had been drunk
(R. 10 and 11). That on or about May 12, 1951, the Police
Deparhnent conducted a raid of said premises and that
two police officers observed the Defendant beckon to a
white and colored man who approached her on the front
porch. After some conversation, the Defendant motioned
these two men to a side door (R. 18, 19). That the police
officers went to the rear of this home, and, looking
through the window, observed a white man and a colored
woman in the act of sexual relations (R. 19, 20). That a
further examination of this house disclosed many whiskey bottles and glasses (R. 22, 23). That the Defendant
and her children were present that night, but that her
husband was not (R. 24). This course of conduct had
continued over a long period of time and had disturbed
the neighbors (R. 44, 45, 46 and 48). That the Defendant and her husband jointly purchased and operated this
home (R. 53, 54). However, he worked separate and
apart from the home so that the Defendant actively con-
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ducted the business of running the home. The Defendant's husband was not h01ne at the tin1e of the raid on
~lay 1:!, 1951 (R. 6:2). The Defendant told the officers
that he had left for work (R. 76, 77). At the conclusion of the testimony the Defendant's counsel requested
two instructions. The Court denied the first requested
instruction (R. 15 ), the Defendant's second requested
instruction being as follows :
''DEFENDANT'S REQUEST NO 2
You are instructed that under the law of this
state, a married woman is not capable of comn1i tting a crime, where the punishment is less than
death, or treason, while acting under the threats,
command or coercion of her husband, and in this
respect you are instructed that if you believe
from the evidence, that the defendant was a married woman, living with her husband on the 12th
day of May, 1951, and committed any of the offenses charged in the (three) complaints under
the command, influence, coercion or threats of her
husband, then, and in that event, it is your duty
to acquit her on each charge.
You are further instructed that if you have a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not she was
so acting under such influence of her husband,
you should acquit her."
The said Defendant's second requested instruction
was given substantially by the Court as its Instruction
No. 9 (R. 101, 102) as follows :
"No. 9: You are further instructed that under the law of this state a married woman is not
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capable of committing a crime such as the ones
charged against this defendant while she is acting
under the threats, command, or coercion of her
husband; and in this respect you are instructed
that if you believe from the evidence that the
defendant was a married woman, living with her
husband, on the 12th day of May, 1951, and committed any of the offenses charged against her
while under the command, influence, coercion, or
threats of her husband, then and in that ~vent it is
your duty to acquit her of these charges or of the
charge which you believe that she committed
while acting under her husband's threats, comrnands, coercion, or influence. You are further
instructed that if you have a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not she was so acting, you ought
to acquit her. In other words, she does not have
the burden of convincing you by even a preponderance of the evidence that she was acting
under the influence of her husband. In order for
you to find her guilty, you must find that she was
not under the influence, and if you find she was,
you must acquit her, or if you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not she was under his influence, you must acquit her."
After the verdict, the Defendant filed a Motion in
Arrest of Judgment (R. 114) and a

~lotion

For a New

Trial (R. 115), which motions were denied.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
HEAR THIS MATTER ON APPEAL.
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POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT.

POINT Ill.
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION UNDER UTAH
LAW THAT A MARRIED WOMAN, WHILE COMMITTING
A CRIME, IS ACTING UNDER THE COMMAND, COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF HER HUSBAND.

ARGl':JIENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
HEAR THIS MATTER ON APPEAL.

Sec. 20-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides as
follo·ws:
"Appeals shall lie from the final judgments
of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases
to the district courts, on both questions of law and
fact, with such limitations and restrictions as are
or may be provided by law; and the decisions of
the district courts on such appeals shall be final,
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute; and appeals shall also lie
to the district courts from the final judgments
of the city courts, and from the final judgments
of the juvenile courts, except where a direct appeal to the supreme court is expressly provided
for."
Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide as follows:
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" (a) F'rom Final Judgments. An appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court from all final
judgments, in accordance with these rules; provided, that in actions originating in city courts
and in justices' courts, the decision of the district
court on appeal shall be final, except: (1) In
cases involving the validity or constitutionality
of a statute or ordinance; and (2) In actions originating in city courts in which the amount in controversy exceeds $100.00, exclusive of costs."
The Appellant herein does not anywhere question
the validity or constitutionality of any City ordinance
or State statute. The above statutes and rules specifically provide that the decisions of the District Court on
such matters as the one he-rein contained shall be final
unless there is involved a question of the validity or
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute. Nowhere
in Appellant's brief does she charge the invalidity or unconstitutionality of either a City ordinance or State statute in the matter in question, but, to the contrary, she
merely claims a misinterpretation of a question of law by
the District Court concerning a presumption established
by common law and since changed in Utah by a change
of circumstances and statutes.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT.

My statement herein contained and the transcript of
the testimony taken at the time of trial is overwhelming
and without contradiction to the effect that the house
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in question was used by Defendant oYer a long period of
time as a disorderly house and to the continual and persistent disturbance of the inunediate neighbors, and Defendant, in her brief, at page·:s 9 and 10 thereof, admits
that the evidence discloses a course of conduct existing
oYer a period of seYeral months prior to the date of
arrest on ~[ay 12, 1951, which constituted disorderly conduct by both colored and white people, young and old, resorting to said place and drinking intoxicating liquor and
conducting then1selYes in a boisterous and immoral way.
POINT III.
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION UNDER UTAH
LAW THAT A MARRIED WOMAN, WHILE COMMITTING
A CRIME, IS ACTING UNDER THE COMMAND, COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF HER HUSBAND.

The only point 1nade by Appellant on which there
can be any argument is whether or not, under Utah law,
the common law presumption still exists to the effect that
a married woman is not liable for crime excepting murder and treason com1nitted in the presence of her husband. I first wish to call to the Court's attention Appellant's requested instruction on this point which is herein
set forth in full in the Statement of Facts and the actual
instruction given by the trial court which is also set forth
in full herein in the Statement of F'acts, which instruction, as given, is even more favorable to the Defendant
than the one requested. It is my opinion and judgment
that the trial court went much further than the law requires in the instruction submitted to the jury and by
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which they were bound in their deliberation. Some few
states still follow the old common law rule that a married
woman is not liable for a crime committed in the presence
of her husband since under the common law it was presumed that she acted under constraint from him. However, Utah, as has the majority of the states, enacted
statutes which modify greatly the common law. Section
103-1-40, sub-section (8) reads as follows:
"103-1-40. Who Are Capable of Committing
Crime.
All persons are capable of committing crimes,
except those belonging to the following classes :
(8) :l\larried women, unless the crime is punishable with death, acting under the threats, command or coercion of their husbands."

It will be noted that this statute constitutes a substantial departure from the provision of the common
law whe-rein it was there provided that a married woman
was not liable for crime excepting 1nurder and treason
committed in the presence of her husband. It is therefore
the Respondent's position that it is incumbent upon the
Defendant to show by competent evidence that her act
was committed because of or under the threats, command
or coercion of her husband. It should also be noted
that Sections 40-2-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, specifically emancipate women in the
State of Utah and that the old common law theory that
a husband and wife are one for all purposes is forever
in the State of Utah dissolved and completely abolished
and abandoned.
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The eourts in Yarious jurisdidions base their deci:'ions on various theories. It is interesting to note that
in Tennessee the courts base their decision that the wife
is no longer under the disability of coverture. I refer to
the case of Gill c. JlcKinuey,l40 Tenn. 559,205 ~.\V. 416,
wherein the court said:
"This supposed duress of the wife by the fact
of marriage, like all other doctrines, built upon
the legal identity of husband and wife, must depend upon the disability of the wife by virtue of
1narriage. The policy of this state is completely
changed so that married women are no longer
under the disability of coverture and are completely emancipated."
There is then the Kentucky rule that the statute
providing that a wife holds and owns all of her separate
estate and may contract destroys the· common law presumption. In the case of King v. City of Owensboro, 218
S.W. 297, it \Vas contended that the court should have
given an instruction that if the defendant sold the liquor
in the presence of her husband, the law presumes that
she acted in obedience to his command and under his coercion and that they should find her not guilty. The court
said:
"The ru1e is a harsh one at best, and with
the progress of civilization and the changes by
wise modern legislation of the relation between
husband and wife as to the right of property and
personal control by the husband, it wou1d seem
absurb in this enlightened age to regard the wife
as a 1nere machine made to labor and to talk as
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the husband directs and to make him liable on that
ground for her torts when not c01nmitted by his
direction or procurement."
and concluded by saying:
"We therefore conclude that there is no
longer a presumption that a 1narried woman who
commits a cri1ne conjointly with or in the presence of her husband acts under his coercion, and
it follows that the court's failure to instruct the
jury to that effect was not in error."
Also, see State v. Hendricks) 32 Kan. 559, 4 P. 1050.
For a discussion of the rule under the modern married woman's acts see Morton v. State) 209 S.W. 644,
where it was held that the rule of the common law no
longer exists and a married woman is responsible for her
crimes as if a femme sole.
In the case of Wampler v. N ortonJ 134 Ya. 606, 113
S.E. 733, the court declared in reference to a charge of
keeping ardent spirits for sale:
"that the defendant cannot excuse herself
from guilt upon this or any other sort of criminal
charge merely by showing the marriage and
pleading a consequent technical coercion by her
husband. Thus, for example, when they are living
together in a house kept for immoral purposes,
she cannot successfully defend a prosecution
therefor on the ground that the law presumes her
to be acting under his control."
In the case of State v. RenslowJ an Iowa case, 230
N.W. 316, the court held that the rule of presumptive
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coercion did not apply to the act of a Inarried woman
in receiving stolen property frmn her husband. The court
said:
"that lmder the statutes of Iowa, where practically aU of the disabilities and disadvantages of
coYerture are remoYed and a wmnan stands in the
eyes of the law with practically all of the rights,
duties and privileges of a femme sole, we see no
reason for the further application of this rule in
this state."
In the case of Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 34,
the court said :
''There were two reasons on which the common law rule was based. First, that man and
wife are one, and that one cannot conspire. Second, that the husband is presumed to control the
wife."
and further concluded:
"that both these propositions have been abandoned and also the legislation in respect to the
marital relation. The law of this state requires
the coercion by the husband to be proved."
In the case of State v. Carpenter, an Idaho case,
reported in 176 P. 2d 919, the court held that it was not
in error in failing to give an instruction of the common
law rule where a wife was convicted of giving hacksaw
blades to her husband in jail to aid him to escape, stating
that the common law had been changed by statute.
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A case directly in point is the case of People v.
Statley, a California case reported in 206 P. 2d 76. The
California Statute is identical with the Utah Statute.
In that case the court quotes from Katz v. Walkinshaw,
1903, 141 Gal. 116, 122, 123, 70 P. 663, 74 P. 766, 767, 64
L.R.A. 236, 99 Am. St. Rep. 35 as follows:
"* * * In Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. (136), 143
the court approved the following rule * * *
"'It is contrary to the spirit of the common
law itself to apply a rule founded on a particular
reason to a case where that reason utterly fails.'
* * *
"The true doctrine is that the common law
by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions, and modifies its own rules so as to serve
the ends of justice under the different circumstances-* * *
" 'When the reason or a rule ceases, so should
the rule itself.
"'It is a well-settled rule that the law varies
with the varying reasons on which it is founded.
This is expre·ssed by the maxim, "Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex." This means that no law
can survive the reasons on which it is founded.
It needs no statute to change it; it abrogates itself. If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne, by opposing reasons, which, in the progress
of society, gain controlling force, the old law,
though still good as an abstract principle, and
good in its application to some circumstances,
must cease to apply or be a controlling principle
to the new circumstances.'"
For two good annotations, it is suggested the court
review 4 A.L.R. 279 and 71 A.L.R. 1123.
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CONCLUSION
That the Appellant's appeal be disinissed and that
the same be ren1anded with instructions to carry out the
sentence heretofore in1posed by the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOL~IGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistant City Attorneys,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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